Auth Flow Reviewer

Review authentication and authorization code for exploitable gaps without touching a line of it. The skill walks the session/token model, cookie flags, CSRF defenses, token lifecycle, password-reset and email-verification flows, and OAuth parameter validation — then spends most of its effort on the part teams routinely skip: confirming that every protected route enforces an object-level access check. A login form that works tells you nothing about whether user A can read user B's invoice by editing an ID. Output is a findings list grouped by severity, each with a location, the concrete impact, and the fix.

When to use this skill

• Before shipping login, signup, session, JWT, or refresh-token code.
• When adding a new protected route, an admin action, or a "share by link / by ID" feature — anywhere a request carries an object identifier.
• Reviewing a password-reset, email-verification, or OAuth/SSO integration.
• During a scheduled security pass, or after a pentest/bug report mentioning broken access control.

Instructions

1. Map the surface first. Glob for routers, middleware, controllers, and guards (**/routes/**, **/middleware/**, **/*controller*, **/*guard*, **/auth/**). Build a list of every endpoint and tag each as public, authenticated-only, or authorized (requires ownership/role). You cannot review what you have not enumerated — an unlisted route is the one that ships unprotected.
2. Classify the session model. Determine whether the app uses server-side sessions (cookie holds an opaque session id) or stateless tokens (cookie/header holds a JWT). The two have different failure modes: sessions need a server store and explicit invalidation on logout; JWTs cannot be revoked before expiry without a denylist. Flag any hybrid where a JWT is treated as revocable but no denylist exists.
3. Audit cookie flags on every auth cookie. Confirm HttpOnly (blocks JS/XSS theft), Secure (HTTPS-only), and an explicit SameSite (Lax minimum; Strict for the session cookie when feasible; None requires Secure and a CSRF defense). Grep for cookie-setting calls (set-cookie, res.cookie, Set-Cookie, framework session config) and report any auth cookie missing a flag, with the exact line.
4. Verify CSRF protection on state-changing requests. Any cookie-authenticated POST/PUT/PATCH/DELETE needs a CSRF defense: a per-session synchronizer token, double-submit cookie, or strict SameSite plus origin checking. Token/Authorization: Bearer flows in headers are not CSRF-prone, but cookie flows are. Flag every mutating, cookie-authed endpoint with no token check or origin/referer validation.
5. Trace the token lifecycle. For JWTs/access tokens, check: signing algorithm is pinned (reject alg: none and confirm the verifier does not accept attacker-chosen algorithms), expiry is short (minutes, not days), the secret/key is not hardcoded, and the payload carries no secrets. For refresh tokens, require server-side storage, rotation on use (old token invalidated when a new one is issued), and reuse-detection that revokes the family on replay. Flag tokens stored in localStorage (XSS-readable) where a cookie would be safer.
6. Review password reset and email verification as untrusted token flows. For each, confirm: the token is high-entropy (CSPRNG, not a sequential id, timestamp, or weak hash), single-use (consumed/invalidated after first use), short-lived (minutes to an hour), and bound to the target user. Critically, confirm the flow does not enumerate users — the "reset email sent" and "verify" responses must be identical for existing and non-existing accounts (same body, same status, same timing). Flag any reset that returns "no such user".
7. Validate OAuth/SSO parameters. Confirm redirect_uri is checked against an exact-match allowlist (not a prefix/substring/regex that an attacker can satisfy with evil.com?x=trusted.com), and that the state parameter is generated, stored, and verified on callback to stop CSRF/login-fixation. For authorization-code flows, confirm PKCE is used for public clients and the code is exchanged server-side.
8. Enforce object-level authorization on every protected route — the core check. For each endpoint that accepts an object id (path param, query, or body), confirm the handler verifies the current principal is allowed to act on that specific object (e.g. WHERE owner_id = session.user.id, or an explicit policy/ability check), not merely that someone is logged in. Look for the anti-pattern: authentication middleware present, but the query fetches by id alone. Also check privilege escalation: role/permission read from the request body or a client-supplied field instead of the server-trusted session; missing isAdmin gates on admin endpoints; mass-assignment that lets a user set their own role.
9. Report; do not modify. Produce the severity-grouped findings (see Output). The skill is read-only — propose the fix, leave the change to the author.

Output

A findings report grouped by severity, with a one-line scope header (what was reviewed) and, for each finding, a file:line location, the impact in attacker terms, and the concrete fix. Nothing is edited.

Auth flow review — scope: src/routes/**, src/middleware/auth.ts, src/auth/oauth.ts
12 endpoints enumerated (3 public, 5 authenticated, 4 authorized)
 
CRITICAL
- IDOR on invoice fetch — src/routes/invoices.ts:41
  Impact: any logged-in user reads any invoice; `findById(req.params.id)` has no
          owner check. GET /api/invoices/123 returns 123 to anyone.
  Fix:    scope the query — findOne({ id, ownerId: req.session.userId }); 404 on miss.
 
- Privilege escalation via body — src/routes/users.ts:88
  Impact: PATCH /api/users/me accepts { role } from the request body (mass assignment);
          a user can set role: "admin".
  Fix:    whitelist updatable fields; derive role only from server state, never the body.
 
HIGH
- Refresh token not rotated — src/auth/tokens.ts:53
  Impact: a stolen refresh token works until expiry and is never invalidated on reuse.
  Fix:    rotate on each use, persist the new token, and revoke the family on replay.
 
- User enumeration on password reset — src/routes/auth.ts:120
  Impact: reset endpoint returns 404 "no such user", letting attackers harvest valid emails.
  Fix:    return an identical 200 "if an account exists, an email was sent" in all cases.
 
MEDIUM
- Session cookie missing SameSite — src/middleware/session.ts:17
  Impact: cookie sent on cross-site requests; widens CSRF exposure.
  Fix:    add SameSite=Lax (or Strict) alongside HttpOnly and Secure.
 
- OAuth redirect_uri prefix match — src/auth/oauth.ts:34
  Impact: startsWith() allows https://trusted.com.evil.com — open redirect / token theft.
  Fix:    exact-match redirect_uri against a registered allowlist.
 
Summary: 2 critical, 2 high, 2 medium. No code modified.