Claude Settings Auditor

Claude Code's behavior is the merge of up to five settings sources — and the merged result is what nobody ever reads. This skill reads it for you: every layer, precedence applied, with each risky or dead rule called out and a safer replacement proposed. Run it on a freshly cloned repo before working in it, or on your own setup before granting more autonomy.

When to use this skill

• You cloned a repo with a checked-in .claude/settings.json (and maybe .mcp.json and hooks) and want to know what you're trusting before the first session.
• Your permission prompts feel wrong — too many, too few — and you want the effective rule set explained.
• You're about to loosen the reins (acceptEdits, broader allows, CI automation) and want the floor checked first.

When NOT to use this skill

• You want to write a specific hook — that's hook-writer.
• You're auditing the application's code for vulnerabilities — that's the security-auditor agent; this skill audits the agent harness configuration itself.

Instructions

1. Collect every layer. Read ~/.claude/settings.json, .claude/settings.json, .claude/settings.local.json, and check for managed policy files (platform-specific admin paths). Include .mcp.json and any .claude/hooks/ scripts referenced. Note which files exist, which are committed to the repo, and which are personal.
2. Compute the effective configuration. Apply precedence (managed > local > project > user) and the permission decision order (deny → ask → allow). Produce the merged permissions table, the active hooks by event, the MCP servers by scope, and the notable toggles (defaultMode, enableAllProjectMcpServers, disableAllHooks, autoMemoryEnabled).
3. Hunt permission holes. Flag, with severity: blanket allows (Bash, Bash(*), mcp__* in allow), allows that swallow more than intended (Bash(git *) covers git push --force), missing deny rules for secrets (.env*, key files, cloud credential paths), WebFetch unbounded, and bypassPermissions as a default mode anywhere outside a container.
4. Vet hooks and MCP servers as supply chain. For each hook script: what does it execute, is the source readable, does any blocking hook fail open? For each MCP server: scope, provenance, whether secrets are inline instead of ${VAR} expansion, and whether enableAllProjectMcpServers auto-approves more than the user realizes. Read the scripts — don't trust filenames.
5. Find dead and shadowed rules. Rules that can never fire (shadowed by an earlier deny, malformed pattern, the Bash(ls *)-vs-lsof word-boundary trap, tools that don't exist) are noise that breeds false confidence — list them for deletion.
6. Report by severity, then propose the patch. CRITICAL (acts now, dangerous), WARN (risky under the wrong prompt), INFO (hygiene). For each finding: the file and line, why it matters in one sentence, and the exact replacement rule. Offer the corrected settings JSON as a diff the user can apply — but do not modify files unless asked.

Output

An effective-configuration summary (what wins, from which file), a severity-ordered findings list with file:line and one-line impact each, and a ready-to-apply corrected settings diff — plus the explicit list of things that looked unusual but are fine, so the next auditor doesn't re-litigate them.